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CEPS EXPLAINER

AN EU GLOBAL GATEWAY... TO WHAT?

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SUMMARY

What is Global Gateway's unique offer? How does it beat the competition? Why is Global Gateway a values-based offer and what does this entail in practical terms? Amid criticism and comparisons, the EU's Global Gateway deserves scrutiny and effort to define its purpose and added value, both within and outside the EU.

Initially designed as a foreign policy strategy, Global Gateway has not been put to its intended use. Instead, the first two years of implementation have highlighted conceptual and structural challenges that fall short of the EU's international needs and ambitions. Up to now, it has focused on delivery, namely Team Europe, flagship projects, and investment packages.

The EU's projected power and credibility with its international partners is at stake. However, trusted and resilient connectivity links are difficult to build without putting the foreign policy versus development debate to rest.

Differentiating the EU's offer from its competitors and addressing dwindling credibility requires strong and coherent international leadership. As this CEPS Explainer outlines, resources aggregation approach 'à la IMEC', holds the potential to better connect narrative to implementation and build the EU's external power. Developing on from this, the strategic connectivity clusters (SCCs) approach streamlines international connectivity cooperation.



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SETTING THE SCENE

When Global Gateway's [Joint Communication](#) was adopted in 2021, a comparison was immediately made to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). With good reason – both are worldwide connectivity initiatives and both are foreign policy tools with clear ambitions to influence global governance.

There are of course countless differences, from governance to financing, and from motivations to delivery. To the EU, a value proposition sets them apart, that of creating trusted 'links, not dependencies' and promoting 'democratic values worldwide.' In response to the Global Gateway strategy, the policy debate in Europe floated the words 'too little, too late' so many times that it is difficult to credit them.

Then and now, Global Gateway still suffers from unflattering comparisons to the 10-year old BRI, not to mention China's three new global initiatives (one for '[development](#)', one for '[security](#)', and one for '[civilisation](#)'.) Other large-scale initiatives, perceived as responses to BRI, include the [Blue Dot Network](#) (BDN), founded by the US, Japan and Australia, and the G7's Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) (2022), with Global Gateway being the EU's contribution.

In this crowd of like-minded and less like-minded international partners, Global Gateway deserves more scrutiny and effort to define exactly what it is, what it brings to the table and why.

Launched by the self-described 'geopolitical Commission' of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, Global Gateway projects and communications still resemble traditional development cooperation, albeit with a [one-sided economic interest](#) twist. On top of this, Global Gateway is expected to grapple with the key problems and priorities of our time – economic security, technological competition, the climate-security nexus and more. Without a clearer purpose for the overall strategy, it remains difficult to evaluate Global Gateway's performance thus far and its future prospects.

This CEPS Explainer presents Global Gateway as a foreign policy strategy which is not being used as it was initially designed – a strategy that allows the EU to take on a unique and consistent role on the international stage. To overcome its structural challenges from governance to implementation, this Explainer highlights the programme's potential competitive advantages and outlines a possible approach known as 'strategic connectivity clusters' (SCC).

The SCC approach aims to increase strategic complementarity and cooperation for 'Team Europe' at various multilateral levels, to ensure Global Gateway succeeds in an increasingly fragmented world – where development finance, [influence and power struggles](#) intersect.



FOREIGN OR DEVELOPMENT POLICY?

WHAT CAN CONNECTIVITY DO?

Connectivity is in the EU's very DNA, from the Erasmus+ programme launched in 1987 to the popular 'roam like at home' regime. In 2021, the Commission decided to leverage decades of EU-wide achievements by translating them into a foreign policy tool. But is this pure foreign policy or rather development cooperation with a new face?

ALL FORMS OF CROSS-BORDER CONNECTIVITY CAN LOOK LIKE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION BUT NOT ALL INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION WORKS TOWARDS CONNECTIVITY.

As with so many things, that depends on who you ask.

Connectivity can be both a means to an end – economic development, stability, influence, power – and an end in itself, to sustain a network of mutually beneficial '[smart, clean and secure connections](#)' through key infrastructure

and supporting systems. All forms of cross-border connectivity can look like international development cooperation but not all international development cooperation works towards connectivity.

Rather, Global Gateway is [focused on](#) 'areas of infrastructure that bring solutions to the various challenges in the current geopolitical context' – namely digital, climate and energy, transport, health, education and research.

AN EU RECIPE

From a non-EU perspective, this investment focus can sound simple enough – Global Gateway contributes to filling up the [USD 15 trillion](#) infrastructure investment gap, while defending the EU's economic and security interests, whilst simultaneously seeking synergy with the UN's 2030 Agenda and Paris Agreement commitments. After all, many of the EU's partners have combined these objectives without a second thought, such as Japan which made official development assistance investments its [prime foreign policy instrument](#).

Understanding why the debate differs in the EU – collectively with its Member States the world's largest development donor – requires some institutional and historical detective work. Without going into too much detail, the history of the European Commission's Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA), which is currently responsible for Global Gateway, mirrors the recent evolution of 'Western' development paradigms.



In 2015, the EuropeAid Cooperation Office and the DG for Development and Relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific States (DEV) were reformed into a single entity, DG Development and Cooperation (DEVCO), which included EuropeAid. DEVCO gave way to INTPA in January 2021. The most immediate difference is one of language – from a programme designed to support developing countries in need of assistance, to a push for balanced, eye-to-eye international partnerships. This is a logical fit for Global Gateway, which lists equal partnerships as a core foundational principle.

EU foreign and defence policy, as well as diplomacy, were in different hands however, those of the European External Action Service (EEAS). Meanwhile, the EU became one of [‘the biggest player\[s\] on the global trading scene’](#), its global regulatory might earned a nickname – the [‘Brussels effect’](#) – and the European Green Deal made it the most ambitious continent in terms of addressing climate change as an [‘existential threat to Europe and the world’](#).

HOW GLOBAL GATEWAY CAME ABOUT

The EU started to couple connectivity and foreign policy in 2016 in its [Global Strategy](#), with a focus on Asia and security. The strategy also called for further joint programming ‘across internal and external policies’, a development policy that is ‘more flexible and aligned with our strategic priorities’, and ‘greater coordination between the EU and Member States, the European Investment Bank and the private sector’, all to be catalysed by implementing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Since then, numerous connectivity-based initiatives and partnerships (listed in the Annex at the end of this Explainer) show the European institutions’ progress towards more coherent policy action abroad.

Originally developed as an innovative foreign policy strategy, Global Gateway was met with [institutional resistance](#) at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, primarily due to the fear of antagonising China. Despite this delay, the Commission went on to officially announce Global Gateway in 2021.

Now going through its formative years, during the so-called [age of polycrisis](#) – from pandemic and supply chain disruption and war, to the energy, climate and cost-of-living crises – it is a tool to help achieve geopolitical and economic resilience within this overall state of chaos. Thus, it therefore needs to be ‘polycrisis-proof’, or at least be polycrisis-responsive. But is this really the case?



GOVERNANCE DOUBLE STANDARDS

Global Gateway's management may cause lingering doubts. Initially led by the EEAS, it was then quickly transferred to DG INTPA. There are several potential interpretations over why this happened – that INTPA decides on Global Gateway's budget and is therefore more apt to lead connectivity investments, that the High Representative and the EEAS services [did not particularly care](#) for this portfolio or that it was a pure and simple power grab by the Commission.

Global Gateway [governance](#) is composed of five key elements: (1) a Commissioners-only steering committee, which includes the Commission President and the High Representative, (2) a [Global Gateway Board](#) – including representatives from the European Parliament and two investment banks (EIB, EBRD), (3) a Business Advisory Group (BAG), (4) a Dialogue Platform for civil society and local authorities (GGDP), and finally (5) 'Team Europe' – which will be further unpacked in a section of its own.

[BAG](#) was formed first – though relatively late – in September 2023 to encourage private sector involvement, which is another key Global Gateway principle. Yet while the private sector has been involved from the outset, civil society engagement is not explicitly a Global Gateway principle, though one may easily argue that civil society does contribute to its officially set principles, such as the upholding of democratic values and high standards, good governance and transparency.

The creation of the [GGDP](#), announced only on 24 October 2023, i.e. on the eve of the very first [Global Gateway Forum](#) (GGF), essentially looks like an afterthought. It also puts a primary focus on the SDGs and traditional development cooperation, emphasised by its Commission interlocutor, the Commissioner for International Partnerships, currently Jutta Urpilainen (*full transparency note for the reader: CEPS is the only think tank [listed in the GGDP's ranks](#), which are mostly composed of NGOs for development cooperation and advocacy*).

On the other hand, the BAG meets with the Commission President, which suggests a higher priority on attracting and mobilising private capital. This approach has already hit a few snags – some of the BAG member companies are [linked to the Chinese state](#), unfortunate during a time when the EU is struggling to finetune its de-risking approach to China. Meanwhile, the GGF has been described as '[business as usual](#)', in line with existing criticism of Global Gateway – without new capital, but also without a clear benefit for the EU's international partners.

Between the EU's transition from traditional development cooperation to truly strategic investments and partnerships, authors warning [of 'colonialism 2.0'](#), and the broader sentiment that the EU's foreign policy needs to be updated to [adapt to great power](#)

[competition](#), Global Gateway's implementation is still in dire need of coherence and an uplift of its strategic potential. Though the learning curve in these early years may be steep, the EU is resourceful – and the same should apply to Global Gateway.

WHAT COMPETITIVE EDGE DOES THE EU OFFER?

What is Global Gateway's unique offer? How does it beat the competition? Why is Global Gateway a values-based offer and what does this entail in practical terms?

These questions may not be sufficiently high on the EU's agenda. The current programme-driven approach focuses on delivery and too little on the *why*, leaving a compelling narrative out of the equation. In the ongoing battle of narratives with China's own competitive offer, Global Gateway must present a convincing counter-offer. Global Gateway provides the opportunity to leverage the EU's still-vast economic power to further its own interests, jointly with those of its international partners.

While the EU's DNA was never to become a competitive world hegemon, its credibility as an 'honest broker' in international relations has dwindled. Usual EU talk, including the promotion of common interests and the protection of public goods, is still on-brand, but may be insufficient to project power via Global Gateway and earn credibility with international partners.

TEAM EUROPE

Of course, the EU is more than the sum of its parts but the gap between theory and practice is still daunting. Thus, Global Gateway's most prominent feature is how it will leverage the EU's aggregate economic power through the pooling of EU resources and expertise under the '[Team Europe](#)' banner.

THE TRANSFORMATIVE POTENTIAL OF TEAM EUROPE AND ITS TEAM EUROPE INITIATIVES (TEIS) BY POWERING GLOBAL GATEWAY RELIES ON THE ABILITY TO STREAMLINE THE EU'S EXTERNAL ENGAGEMENT, WHICH OF COURSE IS JEALOUSLY AND FIERCELY CONTROLLED BY THE MEMBER STATES.

Team Europe includes the EU institutions, EU Member States, their agencies and banks, as well as European investment and development banks, all coordinated by DG INTPA. Team Europe also cooperates with non-state actors,

most prominently the European private sector. The transformative potential of Team Europe and its Team Europe Initiatives (TEIs) by powering Global Gateway relies on the ability to streamline the EU's external engagement, which of course is jealously and fiercely controlled by the Member States.

The EU has [mapped the presence](#) of [Team Europe Initiatives](#) (TEIs) at country, regional and global level to focus investment in the target region's 'critical priorities.' TEIs have formidable potential to deliver on global policy issues because of their unique value proposal, prospective transformational impact, and wide geographical coverage.

However, it is worth mentioning that Team Europe precedes – and is not exclusive to – Global Gateway. In fact, in certain policy areas such as migration, the Team Europe approach has actually [drawn some criticism](#).

FROM FLAGSHIP PROJECTS TO CORRIDORS

At the time of writing, Global Gateway's investment offer, broadly the TEIs, takes on two main forms – [flagship projects](#) and [investment packages](#).

Flagship projects are standalone, high-visibility investments in strategic infrastructure; a sure sign that the EU now cares about both its external investments being publicised and its own brand marketing. As [official communications](#) point out in the small print, these projects do not capture all of Global Gateway's engagement, which also includes 'soft measures in a 360° approach, so as to improve the policy, regulatory and business environment, develop skills, foster innovation and transfer technology'. For the second consecutive year, a selection of flagship projects is underway, using non-public (but rather straightforward) guidelines established by the Council's Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors (RELEX).

Throughout 2022 and 2023, the present authors have worked for the EU on identifying potential flagship projects in certain parts of the Indo-Pacific. Key lessons learned included: (a) few projects were ineligible due to their starting before Global Gateway was officially launched, (b) alignment with the equal partnerships principle has been the hardest to evaluate or justify, (c) private sector leverage was either rare or difficult to rationalise, and, perhaps most importantly, (d) standalone projects, though appreciated by all involved parties, have a tendency to create narrow sectoral siloes as a means to respond to complex global issues.

A siloed approach – which contradicts Global Gateway's very nature to leverage various connectivity pillars – is neither beneficial for achieving the SDGs, nor in responding to the EU's strategic interests, such as the need for an efficient green and digital transition (the 'twin transition').

Regional investment packages appear to bring several regional projects into a common context and with common objectives. Though some level of sectoral siloing remains, some packages provide interesting perspectives – for example, the [EU-Africa: Global Gateway Investment Package - Strategic Corridors](#) aims to develop new and greener transport and trade value chains in sub-Saharan Africa and towards the Middle East via Egypt.

EQUAL PARTNERSHIPS, LIKE-MINDEDNESS AND PERMISSION TO BE AMBITIOUS

Connectivity is not neutral – it can be instrumentalised for better or for worse – but it may be done in line with EU and UN values and on one major condition, namely that long-term benefits are fairly distributed. Updating Europe’s engagement with the world may be beneficial, as some of the EU’s international partners remain [sceptical](#) of having to hold equal status with the EU, as well as lingering scepticism over the local benefits of Global Gateway investments. Meanwhile, China routinely accuses the EU of pursuing a colonial mentality in its policies, all while itself being the target of [similar suspicions](#).

Indeed, the world has changed, as exemplified by the growing role of emerging economies in multilateral forums. In this brave new world, the [India-Middle East-Europe corridor](#) (IMEC) deal signed at the 2023 G20 New Delhi Summit is a real opportunity that’s not to be missed. IMEC-style partnerships involving Team Europe are set to become a new staple of Global Gateway engagement.

IMEC promotes a [partnership model](#) ‘on equal grounds with countries that are not always like-minded, nor exactly rivals. Away from bloc thinking, it provides a chance for the EU to define and embody what it wants to be.’ IMEC is not limited to one infrastructure sector and is expected to include not only rail and port links for faster trade, but also electricity cables, a clean hydrogen pipeline and a high-speed data cable – all tremendously important to EU connectivity. High EU standards may be part of the package but the benefit to international partners is clearer. They give the EU permission to be innovative and ambitious and – above all – strategic, all through Global Gateway engagement.

Connectivity corridor projects on IMEC’s scale and visibility are not polycrisis-proof, however. The IMEC Memorandum of Understanding was barely a month old when war

erupted between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, sparking [concerns](#) about delays to the corridor and the many questions likely to be raised over its implementation.

GLOBAL GATEWAY ENGAGEMENT WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE DIVERSIFIED, INNOVATIVE PARTNERSHIP AND INVESTMENT MODELS. ITS STRATEGIC COORDINATION AS A FOREIGN POLICY TOOL IS NEEDED NOW MORE THAN EVER, WITHOUT LOSING SIGHT OF EU VALUES, NAMELY THE RULE OF LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND STANDARDS.

One thing is certain – Global Gateway engagement will continue to pursue diversified, innovative partnership and investment models. Its strategic coordination as a foreign policy tool is needed now more than ever, without

losing sight of EU values, namely the rule of law, human rights and international norms and standards.



PICKING UP THE PIECES

Against the fragmentation of connectivity and the weaponisation of economic dependencies¹

Global Gateway remains a work in progress. Its resources aggregation model has potential for [building up the EU's external power](#), perhaps as much as the 'Brussels effect' on global standards and regulation. In fact, it could multiply such an effect. Last but not least, the EU's [commitment to openness and multilateralism](#), even in a time of great power competition, holds the key to greater EU leadership in global connectivity cooperation.

Global connectivity as a powerful lever for [economic growth and resilience](#), for the UN's SDG Agenda and the protection of the global commons, is currently being undermined by fragmentation and [weaponisation](#). Fragmentation is created by the multiplying of connectivity actors that are necessary to fill the infrastructure and broader SDG investment gap. This is increasingly carried out through the (geo)political [exploitation of economic interdependencies](#). Whether voluntary or not, connectivity fragmentation has numerous potential [negative impacts](#) due to insufficient coordination, including the inefficient use of resources and the depletion of commons.

Greater connectivity coordination with like-minded partners is an approach the EU already endorses, as evidenced by the list of commitments in the Annex below. Yet even with like-minded partners, economic and technological competition can often complicate coordination – this can be potentially eased by innovative platforms such as Trade and Technology Councils.

But what about the less like-minded, from partners to rivals? Is bilateral cooperation enough, especially when coordinating investments in third countries? One could point out that the EU and its Member States are '[collectively the single largest financial contributor to the UN system year after year](#)', which channels most of their development assistance. Is that not enough international goodwill?

As discussed, connectivity is not development cooperation but rather strategic investments into infrastructure and supporting systems. Strategy is essential but so is cooperation. It is also a matter of credibility towards the EU's partners. It may be justified

¹ Note: The following paragraphs on connectivity fragmentation and the Strategic Connectivity Clusters (SCCs) include a partial reformulation of ideas first published in a [T20 India 2023 policy brief](#) co-authored by Fanny Sauvignon (CEPS, EU), Arun S. Nair (RIS, India) and Stefania Benaglia (CEPS, EU) entitled 'Enhancing Interoperability Between Connectivity Initiatives to Achieve the SDGs and Paris Climate Goals'. Early versions of the SCC approach were initially developed by Stefania Benaglia and Fanny Sauvignon based on previous EU-India connectivity research.

for a newly-assertive EU to take part in the [global battle of offers and narratives](#), but working with others is also necessary. Starting with Global Gateway, how could the EU play a more active role in global connectivity coordination?

The answer starts with Team Europe. What makes Team Europe potent is the pooling of resources and expertise under common goals, among countries that have compatible but – more often than not – diverging interests. [Joint programming](#), or the ‘joint response from the EU and its member states to the national development plan of a partner country’, is a key tool of development cooperation. Applying a similar method to global connectivity cooperation is challenging, but possible.

INTRODUCING STRATEGIC CONNECTIVITY CLUSTERS

Our proposed solution revolves around the concept of a ‘strategic connectivity cluster’ (SCC). This is formed by a set of connectivity projects or investments and engagement from various actors, set in a geographically determined space (cross-border area, hub, corridor etc.), and working towards the same regional or global connectivity goal, such as transport and trade or disaster resilience. It requires no joint financing, nor the alignment of every actor’s strategic interests, be they, China, the EU, Japan or India, for example. An SCC does, however, require a coordinated vision of the desired objectives, in line with the the geographical area’s governance.

The SCC approach was developed with several considerations in mind. *First*, that global connectivity investment is a crowded and competitive landscape – wherever Global Gateway goes, others follow or are already there. This is especially true of up-and-coming geostrategic connectivity epicentres, such as the Western Balkans, or the Northeast of India and its sub-Himalayan neighbourhood. *Second*, that coordination and compatibility with other sources of investment is key to proving Global Gateway’s added value with key partners, whom everyone wants to work with. In short, yes, Global Gateway promotes an important set of values but no, that is not enough for our partners to refuse to work with anyone else. *Third*, that the interests of diverse international and regional powers investing in connectivity are distinct and often competing, but they do most often follow the host country or region’s own connectivity plans or vision. *Fourth*, that gathering and securing resources remains necessary to fill global investment gaps. And finally *fifth*, by overcoming joint-financing and preferring coordination, connectivity cooperation can be implemented quickly and by various actors at the same time.

By leveraging on complementarities and minimising gaps, an SCC can achieve more than standalone initiatives by individual actors. It can also facilitate the private sector’s market visibility, as connectivity needs and opportunities are widely publicised. At their core, SCCs are operational tools for policymakers to better articulate traditional development cooperation, research and innovation, as well as new forms of branded connectivity

engagement around a given goal. They aim to facilitate public-private partnerships as well as less institutionalised types of connectivity cooperation and complementarity in a given

AT THEIR CORE, SCCS ARE OPERATIONAL TOOLS FOR POLICYMAKERS TO BETTER ARTICULATE TRADITIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION, RESEARCH AND INNOVATION, AS WELL AS NEW FORMS OF BRANDED CONNECTIVITY ENGAGEMENT AROUND A GIVEN GOAL.

area. It also provides a model that does not separate standalone flagship projects and their enabling environment.

SCCs exploit complementarities between various Team Europe and local partner activities at Global Gateway level, as well as various connectivity projects at

bilateral, trilateral or multilateral levels. The goal is to meet local partners' demand for mutually beneficial strategic investments in a way that is complementary to other offers. If Team Europe manages to advocate for such coordination, all while promoting the added value and sustainability principles of Global Gateway's specific offer, then it can enhance its own credibility in international partnerships.

At multilateral level, SCCs could also prevent the hijacking of connectivity initiatives by weaponised geopolitical and geo-economic interests, instead channelling their competition as a source of complementarity and innovation. If successfully adopted, they would further demonstrate the value of the EU's connectivity offer in target regions, as well as the EU's commitment not only to its own strategic interests, but to those of its partners', to inclusiveness, as well as to the SDGs' 'no one left behind' approach. The democratic value of the UN agenda compared to global connectivity initiatives is a strong argument for an SCC approach to take precedence.

The clustering procedure (or how an SCC is formed):

1. Mapping out all relevant connectivity initiatives in one region, conducted by all targeted stakeholders through an inclusive approach.
2. Defining the thematic and geographical scope of the cluster.
3. Identifying gaps in the cluster and potential hurdles (cluster analysis).
4. Gathering all relevant stakeholders, including relevant authorities and representatives from the scientific community, civil society, private sector, and investors.

CONCLUSION: FUTURE-PROOFING GLOBAL GATEWAY

The past two years have shown that, on the one hand, Global Gateway communication and implementation struggles have differed from traditional development cooperation due to institutional latency. On the other hand, European geoeconomic interests are gaining traction and steering Global Gateway investments towards partnerships that – more often than not – fall short of providing added value to the EU’s international partners. Yet Global Gateway, as a strategy initially developed as a foreign policy tool, has the potential to bring coherence to EU external engagement and strike an optimal balance between complex interests.

Global Gateway’s six key principles are not merely for show. Sometimes, they trigger accusations of hypocrisy from international partners (‘equal partnerships’). Other times, they trigger complaints due to the EU’s due diligence process (‘democratic value and high standards’, ‘good governance and transparency’, ‘green and clean’ etc.), deemed lengthy and costly by many. They also garner internal criticism when principles are not sufficiently adhered to (‘catalysing private sector investment’, ‘security focused’). A coherent Global Gateway, well understood and credible to European and international partners alike, would be steered resolutely towards accomplishing all six principles, without the need to pick and choose.

Now, the EU’s mission is to lay in Global Gateway’s course, whilst harnessing Team Europe and staying true to its principles. The diversity of Global Gateway engagement is a powerful and positive trump card as it dilutes risks and ensures true global visibility.

NOW, THE EU’S MISSION IS TO LAY IN GLOBAL GATEWAY’S COURSE, WHILST HARNESSING TEAM EUROPE AND STAYING TRUE TO ITS PRINCIPLES.

Achieving the EU’s geopolitical ambitions also depends on its renewed strategy for multilateral cooperation on connectivity. Differentiating the EU’s offer from its competitors requires strong and

coherent international leadership. The EU has long pursued an ‘honest broker’ role in its external engagement, claiming some level of neutrality.

Its credibility in that role has very much dwindled over the last few years. Global Gateway offers an excellent opportunity for the next European Commission to rehabilitate the EU’s international reputation.



ANNEX. TIMELINE OF EU STRATEGIC AND CONNECTIVITY OBJECTIVES (2016-2023)

Year	Action	Objective
2016	EU Global Strategy	Connects EU prosperity with security in Asia and highlights the need to deepen connectivity and cooperation with China and other Asian countries.
2017	Euro-Asian Connectivity Mapping Exercise	Linked connectivity in and to Asia to EU security, economic, and geostrategic interests, and highlighted the need for coherence in regulatory frameworks, for sectoral governance, and for increased investments in high-quality connectivity infrastructure.
2018	Joint Communication Connecting Europe and Asia - Building Blocks for an EU Strategy	The Commission's joint communication proposed a holistic EU strategy for sustainable and interoperable Eurasian connectivity based on (1) hard transport, energy, and digital networks, (2) commonly agreed rules and standards, and (3) improved mobilisation of financing resources. It also stressed the importance of people-to-people connectivity through the mobility of people in education and research.
2019	EU-Japan Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure	The Partnership underlines intentions to deepen cooperation on high level, inclusive, and sustainable connectivity by cooperating in multilateral rulemaking and with third partners to spur private sector investments, digital trade, people-to-people mobility, and energy connectivity.
2020	Creation of Team Europe Initiatives	Team Europe was set up as a coordinated and comprehensive response to the Covid-19 pandemic and its implications, with the EU vaccine sharing mechanism as its first action.
2021	European Parliament Resolution on	This resolution called for creating a global EU Connectivity Strategy to extend the current EU-Asia Connectivity Strategy, with the dual goal of strengthening the EU's role as a unified

	Connectivity and EU-Asia relations	geopolitical and geo-economic actor and reinforcing partnerships with like-minded democracies worldwide.
2021	Communication 2030 Digital Compass	This Commission communication sets out a vision for international digital partnerships to invest in digital infrastructure to create business opportunities and increase digital trade. It also aims to increase respect for European values and foster a supportive environment for the EU's human-centric digital model.
2021	EU-India Connectivity Partnership	The Partnership showcases shared interests in deepening EU-India connectivity networks for people, goods, services, data, and capital in the digital, transport and energy sectors, with a focus on inclusivity and sustainability.
2021	EU-US Trade and Technology Council	The EU and US agreed to cooperate in partner countries on trusted connectivity and anti-disinformation capacity building.
2021	Council Conclusions on a Globally Connected Europe	The Council affirmed the economic, security and geostrategic importance of connectivity, both physical infrastructure and regulatory frameworks, and called on the Commission and the High Representative to further implement and expand the EU's connectivity partnerships globally.
2021	Joint Communication on the EU Indo-Pacific strategy	This communication set out core principles and priority sectors (from connectivity to human rights to trade to security to governance) for coherent EU cooperation with partners in the Indo-Pacific.
2021	Launch of Global Gateway	
2022	Council Conclusions on EU Digital Diplomacy	The Council called on the Commission and High Representative to further integrate and expand on digital diplomacy as part of the EU's external action to further its security, climate, and digital interests in an inclusive, democratic, and value-driven way, and in coordination with bilateral and multilateral partners and organisations.

2022	EU-Japan Digital Partnership	The partnership aims to advance cooperation on digital issues to foster economic growth and a human-centric digital transformation based on common values.
2022	EU-Singapore Digital Partnership	This partnership aims to increase the interoperability of digital markets and policy frameworks through, among others, investments in resilient and sustainable digital infrastructure, cooperation in cybersecurity, the development of Digital Trade Principles, and cross-border recognition of conformity assessments. The partnership is one of the pillars for implementing the EU Indo-Pacific strategy.
2022	EU-India Trade and Technology Council	This TTC aims to deepen strategic EU-India trade and technology cooperation with a focus on connectivity, green technologies and resilient supply chains.
2023	EU-Republic of Korea Digital Partnership Republic of Korea – European Union Digital Partnership (partnership full text, 28/11/2022)	This partnership aims to strengthen cooperation on advanced digital technologies and research.

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